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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether informal 
labor markets affect the flows of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), and also whether this effect is similar in developed and 
developing countries. With this aim, different public data 
sources, such as the World Bank (WB), and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) are used, 
and panel econometric models are estimated for a sample of 65 
countries over a 14 year period (1996-2009). In addition, this 
paper uses a dynamic model as an extension of the analysis to 
establish whether such an effect exists and what its indicators 
and significance may be. While the results shows that informal 
labor markets are significant and do positively affect the flow of 
FDI, these effects are felt up to a certain level of informality, 
above which the effect becomes negative. The results are 
similar for developed and developing countries and are robust 
to several checks. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (henceforth FDI) in both developed and developing countries 
have often been  associated with immediate positive effects, such as investment in infrastructure, 
employment generation, and better pay. Moreover, other medium and long term benefits, such 
as technological spillovers, best management practices, capital formation and improvements in 
capital stock quality, are driven by the revenues from new investments. Imitation, skills acquisition, 
competence, and exports are the classic channels that are recognized as the transmitters of these 
benefits (Görg et al. 2005).  It should also be noted that different authors have also shown possible 
negative effects of FDI, such as an increase in wage inequality (Hanousek, Kocenda & Maurel, 
2011). Nevertheless, the proven benefits of FDI are the reason why governments may compete and 
strive to provide the best conditions to investors (Lipsey, 2004).  
Although there is abundant literature on FDI determinants, which examine the process by which 
investments are made in a particular country, there is no conclusive empirical evidence as to which 
determinants are of the most significance and their effects on foreign investments 
(Agiomirgianakis et al., 2006; Blonigen, 2005). There is greater consensus about some 
determinants, however, in the bulk of the literature inasmuch as there is stronger evidence about the 
significance of some variables and their possible effects, such as market size, economic growth, and 
macroeconomic stability. Even so, unanimity does not exist because when it is disaggregated or 
other factors added, as determinants affect each country, region and time period in a different way. 
Among those determinants that have begun to take prominence, we can see the role of institutions 
in each country, although there is little consensus as to which institutions are significant and why 
(Bevan et al., 2004). 
While institutions have been becoming increasingly relevant to economic analysis, the extent of 
their influence on investors’ decisions is unclear, and even more uncertain when considering the 
informal institutions of a society. The informality of the labor market, in any of the definitions 
given in the bulk of the studies, has a negative connotation, although, we can find a few studies 
where there is an opposite effect on economic activity or on investment (Misati, 2010). The 
arguments about the adverse effects of informality tend to be concentrated on the economic growth 
of countries that is transmitted by lower taxes revenues of governments, less infrastructure, and a 
lower level of well-being, as result of the inclusion-exclusion policies of each government with the 
different economic units and individuals that formal institutions do not manage to capture. 
However, what it represents in a society is a topic that has been little studied, that is, the 
relationship with the investment and how it can influence investor decisions, as well as the 
companies’ location or FDI (Misati, 2010). In this study, informality is taken from the point of view 
of the labor market and the workforce of each country, in that it will focus on the vulnerability of 
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workers and the level to which labor institutions are developed. In this way, this study will be able 
to give a general overview as to whether the conditions of the informal market have an influence on 
investments.  
Taking the above into account, this study has the following objectives: to contribute to the literature 
about FDI determinants by analyzing factors not considered by previous research related to this 
topic;  to contribute to the literature by analyzing the influence of informal labor markets and their 
potential role as a determinant of foreign investment flows;  to produce evidence taken from a 
bigger set of countries and over a longer time period than those considered by previous studies, 
something which is also of great relevance to the literature. 
Based on the foregoing, various statistical and econometric techniques will be applied to achieve 
this aim. As both time series and cross-section information are available for various countries, panel 
data analysis forms the basis of this work. One of the advantages of the panel data modeling 
approach is the superior analysis it permits by controlling both individual and temporary effects, 
and, if necessary, the incorporation of past effects and their impact on the analysis. 
The proceeding section gives a review of the literature about FDI determinants, followed by a 
description of the methodology used for the analysis, a description of the database, and a summary 
of the results. The paper finishes by summarizing its main conclusions. 
2 Literature overview  
 
The increasing mobility of capital observed in the last few decades (see Figure 1), seen in both 
goods and capital flows for both developed and developing countries, has been the subject of 
economic studies seeking to examine its origin, and to identify the consequences it has on others 
economic agents. Understanding the factors behind these flows would enable the examination of the 
behavior of companies and an understanding of why some companies decide to be located in 
outside their home country.1 
Regarding the possible economic consequences of capital mobility, many studies have been limited 
to the analysis of its immediate effects, such as the impact of investment on infrastructure, the 
employment directly generated in the country destination for the investment, and the impact of 
relocation on the company’s home country. Others have also considered the possible side effects on 
other participants of these “contagions” (which are known as spillovers), such as innovation in 
                                                          
1 Faeth (2009) summarizes the possible responses from the theoretical point of view; in short, the author divides 
these responses into the differentiation of the product, the maximization of profit, cost reduction, and political variables, 
among others. Cantwell (2010) uses the development of the eclectic paradigm and the OLI model (Ownership-Location 
- Internalization) to explain the decision made by companies to relocate. 
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production and organizational processes, distribution networks, technology, and salaries on local 
companies and competition. While there is no consensus about existence and direction of the effect, 
it is a topic that remains the subject of investigation (Hanousek et al., 2011; Clark et al., 2011). 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
According to the results of previous empirical analyses conducted on FDI determinants, the 
characteristics that may capture more investment for a country are varied, and depend largely on the 
group of countries that are considered in the sample, the time period, and the methodology 
used. Even so, inferences can be made from the trends identifiable in the results obtained for each 
of the variables involved in the studies. 
This section provides a brief review of the most important FDI determinants, as described in the 
relevant empirical studies and literature, in order to analyze in more detail those variables that have 
generated further discussion in the literature. In this set of variables, I drill down to a greater extent 
in the analysis of institutions and, specifically, the role of informal institutions, which is an issue 
still rarely discussed in the literature. 
Based on the literature review, and the classifications made by various authors (Parcon, 2008; 
Whyman, 2006; UNCTAD, 1998; World Economic Forum, 2012), the determinants are split into 
two large blocks referred to as basic and enhancers. The former refers to the group of determinants 
about which there is a growing consensus in the literature as to their effect on FDI and that they 
have or have had a significant statistical weight to both developed and developing countries mainly. 
The latter embodies determinants that may be more susceptible to develop and may be a catalyst in 
attracting FDI. 
 
2.1 Basic Determinants 
 
According to the literature on FDI determinants, there is increasing evidence and consensus about 
their significance. They are grouped and described below in the following order: market size and 
growth, trade openness, infrastructure, labor costs, and macroeconomic environment. 
2.1.1 Market size and growth 
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These are the variables that are most highlighted in the literature or that have more statistical weight 
or significance. Their importance lies in the better use of scale economies, enabling lower costs and 
greater benefits for investors, and, moreover, greater potential demand. The significance is often 
ratified in both developed and developing countries (Agiomirgianakis et al., 2006; Ismail & Yussof, 
2003; Bevan et al., 2004).  
While the approaches to the measurement of these variables may vary, they are proxied mainly by 
means of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Another common method used in their measurement has 
been the population size of each country, which tends to lend weight and statistical significance to 
investors’ decisions (Caetano & Galego, 2009; Ismail & Yussof, 2003). 
Growth prospects, or market potential, have been commonly found to exert a positive influence and 
statistically significant relationship. This variable expresses the purchasing power of the population 
and, thus, the demand. It is usually measured by means of GDP per capita (Agiomirgianakis et al. 
2006; Ranjan, 2011). However, it is also possible to find an adverse effect, likely explained because 
of is capturing the rising costs (Walsh & Yu, 2010). 
 
2.1.2 Trade openness 
 
This variable enables the measurement of how open an economy is to global trade. This refers to the 
size of barriers to import and export that exist across countries, inasmuch that lower barriers would 
involve a reduction in costs to investors. The bulk of the empirical work has found a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between attracting FDI and trade openness (Agiomirgianakis et 
al., 2006; Bevan et al., 2004). The effect is often tested for developing countries 
(Caetano & Galego, 2009; Ranjan, 2011; Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003). However, this impact 
is not generalized in results (Walsh & Yu, 2010). 
 
2.1.3 Infrastructure 
 
The efficiency of the infrastructure of a country and level to which it is extended are seen as key 
points in the operation of any economic activity, as they reduce the distances involved in trade and 
integrate the various regions of the country with foreign markets, thus reducing costs to investors. 
Also, it is seen as a way to get closer to the prosperity of a country and or movement facilities. The 
sense of the effect on the empirical work has changed largely by the way to get to this point and the 
degree of development of the country analyzed. Although, we can find a positive effect 
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(Agiomirgianakis, et al. , 2006; Asiedu, 2006; Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles , 2003), this may vary as 
information is disaggregated inasmuch as there are often differences by economic  sectors 
(Walsh & Yu, 2010), or maybe it can become less important respect to qualitative variables 
(Fung et al. , 2005). This variable is usually approximated by means of the number of kilometers of 
railways, roads, or number of phone lines. 
 
2.1.4 Labor Costs 
 
The relationship between this variable and investments is relatively clearer than other determinants 
because this expresses, in a direct way, the burdens that investors have by law with respect to the 
workers, that is, the benefits are affected directly. In the literature, the balance has leaned toward 
negative effects on the investments (Agiomirgianakis et al. 2006; Bevan et al. 2004). Other studies 
have found a positive and statistically significant effect, arguing that it may express the purchasing 
power of the population (Javorcik, 2005).  This is usually proxied by the wages of each country or 
sector of the economy. 
Most of the discrepancies that exist about the effects of this variable depend on which group of 
countries is being analyzed. For example, the investment flows to transition or developing countries 
have been explained largely by the advantage represented by having lower wages and salaries, 
which would be translated into in lower labor costs compared to developed countries 
(Leibrecht & Scharler, 2009; Ranjan, 2011). 
 
2.1.5 Macroeconomic Environment 
 
The importance of a beneficial macroeconomic environment can be seen in the uncertainty that the 
macroeconomic environment can create in investors through, for example, a high level of debt 
(Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles , 2003), uncertainty that the government can provide services 
efficiently or pay creditors, or a high exchange rate volatility (Trevino & Mixon, 2004). These 
factors, along with high inflation (Asiedu, 2006; Amal et al. 2010; Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles , 
2003) and interest rates (Agiomirgianakis et al. 2006; Ismail  & Yussof, 2003; Walsh  & Yun, 2010) 
may be a reflection of economic instability and uncertainty. If we add a high level of taxation (De 
Mooij & Ederveen, 2003; Feld & Heckemeyer, 2011), all of these factors can be translated into 
costs that companies can expect. 
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2.2 Enhancer determinants 
 
This category groups together the determinants that explain the reduction or increase in the gap 
between developed and developing countries. In this way, they are considered a catalyst in 
attracting FDI. The determinants are analyzed in the following order: agglomeration economies, 
human capital and institutions. The analysis is concentrated largely on institutions, which are split 
into two sub-categories: formal institutions, which includes the role of the government, intellectual 
property and labor regulations (labor flexibility and trade unions), and informal institutions, such as 
corruption and confidence-reputation. 
 
2.2.1 Agglomeration Economies 
 
This variable is closely related to the size and potential of an economy. The arrival of investment to, 
for example, a company or a particular location can attract more investment through the ties that 
exist between the company and other companies, groups or individuals. The country or region is 
then considered a much more appropriate place in which to invest, with a better business 
environment, and scale economies and spillovers to be exploited. Moreover, this variable can be 
explaining the absorption capacity of each country. Although this variable is not usually considered 
due to the limitations of databases, the coefficient is often a statistically significant and positive 
factor in attracting FDI (Walsh & Yu, 2010).  
 
2.2.2 Human Capital 
 
Human capital has been recognized in numerous studies as a means of attracting FDI, as the 
presence of highly skilled workers suggests a more productive society and a more desirable 
destination for investment. In addition, workers with better and higher levels of education are able 
to carry out more complex tasks and adapt to the fluctuations that take place in 
economies. However, some studies do not find this variable statistically significant 
(Agiomirgianakis et al. 2006; Walsh & Yu, 2010).  The significance and direction of the coefficient 
depends on the sample of countries. For example, marginal increases for developed countries do not 
produce the same impact as on developing countries. We can even find results where human capital 
adversely affects investment (Ismail & Yussof, 2003). 
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2.2.3 Institutions 
 
The importance of institutions has been studied with greater interest in recent years, as the role they 
play in the interaction between the different economic actors within a society has become 
increasingly recognized. In other words, they represent the rules of the game and these imply higher 
or lower transaction costs.  
The approach to the management of institutions and their interaction with FDI has not been totally 
made clear in the literature, in terms of everything from definition to quantitative approach (Ali et 
al, 2010). This study differentiates between formal and informal institutions. The former term refers 
mainly to the rule of law, which can be influenced by the state directly, while the latter refers to 
socially shared rules fulfilled by convention (Grogan & Moers, 2001). 
The empirical literature about the effects of formal institutions on FDI has opted to show that flows 
are directed to countries with higher institutional quality while those countries with, for example, 
weak governance tend to deter the arrival of these flows, as weak institutions can act as 
barriers through fees or taxes, and, moreover, can generate uncertainty (Buchanan et al., 2012). 
 
2.3 What kinds of institutions are significant to investments? 
 
The role of government is one of the topics that has already been discussed, because it can intervene 
either directly or by means of regulations. Government can have an important impact, through the 
enactment or amendment of laws, for example, and may affect investment flows. Investment in 
infrastructure is associated with positive effects (Caetano & Galego, 2009) but ambiguous in others 
(Agiomirgianakis et al., 2006). Another form of government intervention can be seen through the 
use of political control or political stability (Grogan & Moers, 2001; Asiedu, 2006; 
Naudé & Krugel, 2007), as well as the fulfillment with the rule of law and a functional financial 
system (Buchanan et al., 2012; Gani, 2007). The literature has also focused largely on the way 
governments give legal protection or legal certainty to investors, often using intellectual property 
rights, which has been found to have a strong positive effect on the attraction of FDI (Du et al., 
2008).  
While the role of labor legislation in each country has been discussed in the literature, the results are 
not conclusive and have focused on the role played by more flexible laws. These results show labor 
legislation having a positive effect on the ability to attract investment (Dewit et al., 2009; Gross & 
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Ryan, 2008; Walsh & Yu, 2010; Javorcik et al., 2005; Ham & Kleiner, 2007). However, other 
studies have found evidence showing a limited or diminished importance or significance 
(Leibrecht & Scharler, 2009), or one that may be related to the degree of flexibility (Parcon, 2008; 
Kucera, 2002), or the extent to which the economic sector is developed in each country (Walsh & 
Yu, 2010). No less controversial is the effect of the unions, although, the balance is leaned by a 
negative effect on the investment (Dewit et al., 2009; Ham & Kleiner, 2007). 
Although the literature reveals little with regard to informal institutions and their effects on the 
localization and flow of FDI, these have been studied from different angles, with corruption one of 
the most recurrent perspectives used to study it. An inverse relationship has been found in the 
literature between corruption and the attraction of FDI, as it implies higher transaction 
costs (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Asiedu, 2006; Du et al., 2008; Gani, 2007). However, there are 
studies where this variable is not important (the coefficient is not statistically significant, as in 
Caetano & Galego, 2009). Another perspective from which informal institutions have been 
considered is through the analysis of trust and reputation. While there only a few studies that have 
examined this issue, the evidence shows that they have a positive impact on FDI (Seyoum, 2011; 
Grogan & Moers, 2001). It is worth mentioning that up to now the activities of the informal labor 
market have been rarely linked to investment. Contrary to the dominant position, they have been 
found to affect FDI in a positive way for certain countries (Misati, 2010). 
It is notable that previous studies have not dealt with the effect of the informal labor market on 
investment, inasmuch as this variable can be used as an approximate measure of the degree to 
which the labor market is restrictive. If this sector is a part of the workforce that is excluded from 
formality and therefore the protection, it is exposed to uncertainty and market shocks. In other 
words, the informal labor market can probably be considered a better indicator of the state of the 
labor market and can be used to examine how the workforce is protected in each country since it is, 
in general, characterized by small-scale, self-employment activities, with low levels of organization 
and technology (Misati, 2010). As it does not generate revenues for governments, the consequences 
of the growth of this sector are that it would not impact substantially on infrastructure investment. 
Furthermore, it is taking place outside of the law and with little regulation (Loayza, 1996).  
However, there are studies where a positive effect is found, as it may represent the sector of 
business where innovation can flourish, thus encouraging investment (Schneider & Klinglmair, 
2004).  
If we take into account the definition of informal labor given by the International Labor 
Organization, by means of the labor vulnerability, then this indicator is associated with the quality 
of employment, the frequency of informal agreements and precarious work. It can, therefore, be 
taken as a better indicator than unemployment figures (Perry & William, 2007). Do, then, all these 
labor market characteristics have an influence on investment, and, above all, what is the effect of 
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the informal labor market on foreign investment? It is worth remembering that either formal or 
informal institutions represent higher or lower costs in any interaction between the agents. 
 
FIGURES 4 and 5 
 
TABLE 1 
3 Data 
 
The database used in this study is taken from the combination of different statistical sources 
compiled by institutions such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Bank (WB), the 
Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. The databases used are described in Table 2. Due to 
the availability of information, the period of study is from 1996 to 2009, and the data obtained are 
reported annually. Table 3 shows the countries considered in the analysis, a list which varies 
according to the model used. In this way, the maximum number of countries is sixty-five, but in 
some models this is reduced to thirty due to data availability problems.  
 
TABLES 2 and 3 
 
The variable of interest in the research, labor informality and its effect on investment, is an area 
seldom discussed in the literature, and one that has been approached from different perspectives. 
The method used to measure it is very different across studies (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Asiedu, 
2006; Du et al., 2008; Gani, 2007; Seyoum, 2011; Grogan & Moers, 2001). In accordance with the 
different classifications or approaches taken into account by the ILO (Perry & William, 2007),  the 
informal labor is taken as vulnerable employment in this study, a variable taken from the World 
Bank. Taking this definition has the advantage that we can incorporate into the analysis more 
countries and wider time periods than those typically collected in the literature on informal 
institutions and FDI determinants. Moreover, most of studies tend to be cross sectional. Besides, the 
variable definition is considered the best option available, due to the difficulty represented by 
approximation or measurement, and the benefit offered to the study in terms of comparison and the 
number of years taken into account. 
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The descriptive analysis considers sixty-five countries from different continents in the time 
period 1996-2009. However, in some of the econometric models used, the sample is reduced by 
almost half depending on statistical information available for each variable. 
4 Methodology 
 
Firstly, panel data analysis is used in this study, taking into account the transversal 
information and the time period of fourteen years, in order to determine whether the variable of 
interest has an effect on FDI. This methodology has the advantage of being able to take into account 
the individual characteristics of each country. The basic model of the determinants of FDI, which is 
our dependent variable, is the following: 
????? ? ?? ? ????? ? ???? ? ???                                           (1) 
Where: 
?????= Foreign Direct Investment made in country "i" in the time period "t" 
??? = Is the vector of control variables such as GDP, GDPpc, openness, inflation, labor costs, 
corruption, and labor flexibility  
???? = Vulnerable employment, proxy of the informality of workforce 
??? = Term of random disturbance 
This model has a balanced panel data, in that it enables the observation of all the individual units in 
all the periods of time (Ti = T for all i), and it is considered short. The error term is undertaken as 
independent. The individual effects are incorporated into the general model in order to capture the 
characteristics of each country, which are assumed as fixed on the time: 
????? ? ?? ? ???? ? ???? ? ???                                              (2) 
Where ?? = individual specific effects 
At this stage of the analysis, the model is subjected to the Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2003) in 
order to determine the most appropriate method, out of the fixed or random effect. This test takes as 
a null hypothesis that if the individual effects are random, the estimators should be similar, because 
they are consistent. On the other hand, in the alternative hypothesis, the estimators differ. 
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Another way of extending the model is to allow that the intercept may change across individuals 
and time. This is carried out in order to incorporate possible events, such as economic shocks, that 
may affect the set of countries in the period of study, which results in: 
 
????? ? ?? ? ?? ? ???? ? ???? ? ???                                         (3) 
As previously mentioned, over time, investment may attract more investment in the future. 
Agglomeration economies are, therefore, taken into account, with the dependent variable being 
lagged one year on the right side of the equation, as follows: 
 
????? ? ?? ? ???????? ? ???? ? ???? ? ???                                (4) 
 
As we can see in the above equation, which is a dynamic model, it is necessary to be careful when 
estimations are carried out because the lagged dependent variable and the correlated errors lead to 
inconsistent estimates of parameters whether are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
Therefore, the above equation is estimated by means of the best known method, that used by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). Initially, the control variables are treated as exogenous.  
5 Results 
 
Before moving on to the results of the panel data analysis for the determinants of FDI, this paper 
will consider some descriptive evidence. In Figure 2, we can see the dispersion of informality and 
FDI. This gives a general overview of the relationship between these two variables, although other 
variables that may influence dependent variables are not taken into account. In Figure 3, we can see 
the evolution of both variables between 1996 and 2009.  
 
FIGURES 2 and 3 
 
The descriptive statistics for the rest of the variables considered in this study can be seen in Tables 4 
and 5. As shown in Table 4, the different control variables used in the study, as well as the variable 
of interest, have different degrees of association among them. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
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was used to test multicollinearity among the different independent variables and was not 
found among the variables. The test values of the VIF are below 4.63, which is below the accepted 
limit. It is worth mentioning that the variable of interest and the different institutional variables 
considered in the study were subjected to the exogeneity test  proposed by Mackinnon (Wooldridge, 
2000), meaning that it was not necessary to have instrumental variables in the panel data analysis. 
The results have not been included for space limitations, but are available upon request to the 
author. 
 
TABLES 4 and 5 
 
In Table 6, we can see the results of the econometric analysis carried out on the database. In order 
to give a better picture of the effect of the informal labor market on investments, we start with 
Model 1, which is the general model for the group of sixty five countries, for which, according to 
the Hausman test, the appropriate method is fixed effects. The coefficient associated with the 
variable of interest (the informal labor markets (V.E.)) has a positive sign and is statistically 
significant at five percent. It is important to emphasize the meaning of effect as contrary to what 
might be expected, and that informal labor market expressed by means of the variable of the 
employment vulnerability, may represent adverse conditions in labor markets for workers, but 
affecting in a positive way the attraction of investments by means of profits. In the following 
models is cleaned its effect.  
 
TABLE 6 
 
On the other hand, the control variables taken into account by this study have the expected effect. 
The level of income, or purchasing power as expressed by GDP per capita (GDPpc), of the citizens 
of each country has a positive effect and its coefficient is, as expected, statistically significant to the 
usual levels. The coefficient associated with trade openness, expressed by the variable openness in 
the different models, is statistically significant at one percent with a positive impact. Inflation, 
which represents macroeconomic stability, has a negative effect and the coefficient associated with 
it is statistically significant to the usual levels, as can be seen across the different models and as 
described by the various authors cited here in the literature review. However,  the coefficient which 
is associated with GDP growth (GDPg) and which expresses potential demand has a negative sign 
and is statistically significant at one percent. However, it is not the sign predicted by the bulk of the 
literature, which is not an irregular finding, as the results for this variable may suggest that greater 
growth may deter investments and FDI on the grounds of the cost of doing business in a country. In 
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terms of material and labor capital, the higher the standard of living, the greater the cost of 
investment (Buchanan et al., 2012). 
 
In Table 6, Model 2 incorporates the effect of agglomeration economies on the analysis. As 
previously mentioned, this variable is considered important because investments made today may 
have an effect on the attraction of investment in the future. For this reason, the dependent variable is 
lagged by one period. As mentioned above, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is used to work this specification. The variable added has a 
positive effect and its coefficient is statistically significant at the level of one percent, with the 
expected result agreeing with the literature review. The variable of interest retains its positive effect 
on  investment and the statistical significance becomes stronger, rising to a level of significance of 
one percent. 
 
Table 6 shows the results of estimating Model 3, namely adding to the previous model the quadratic 
term of the variable of interest in order to ascertain whether the effect captured occurs only up to a 
certain level (non-linear relationship). In fact, when incorporated, neither the variable of interest, 
the coefficient, nor the sign sense lose statistical significance at the usual rate. Moreover, the 
squared term has a negative sign and the coefficient is significant at one percent. Then, one of the 
first conclusions about the relationship between informal labor markets and investment is that it is 
positive only up to a certain level, as we can see in the model, where in the first instance, the 
informal labor market has a positive effect which later becomes negative. 
 
Model 4, in Table 6, is the same model as above, but incorporates the time trend effect with the aim 
of taking into account the different events that are common to that set of countries at that time, and 
thus being able to clear the effect of the independent variables. As we can see, the effect of the 
variable of interest on FDI does not change. In the same way, the statistical significance of the 
quadratic term does not change either. 
 
In Model 5, in order to incorporate more institutional variables and labor market variables, 
corruption and labor flexibility variables are added. In this way, it is possible to better capture the 
effect of the informal labor market on investment. As can be seen, even when we incorporate these 
variables, neither does the effect of variable of interest change, nor does the quadratic term, and the 
statistical significance of the coefficient is held at the usual levels. As this model also incorporates a 
time trend, it tries to clean even more the effect of the variable studied. It is worth stating that in this 
model the sample includes only 40 countries because of the lack of available information for some 
of the variables added. 
In Table 7, the same analysis used previously is developed, splitting the developed from the 
developing countries, thus enabling the identification of differences between them in terms of the 
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effect on FDI of the variable of interest. In Model 2, in the results for the developed countries, the 
informality of labor markets maintains its positive effect and has a statistical significance of ten 
percent; furthermore, the control variables demonstrate the same behavior as that predicted in the 
literature. Furthermore, when the quadratic term is incorporated into the analysis, the preliminary 
findings remain valid, in that informal labor markets positively affect FDI flows up to a certain 
level, and then go on to act as a deterrent to FDI. Trying to clean the effect of the variable is 
incorporated the trend time effect in Model 4.The results have the same sense said before. 
 
TABLE 7 
 
The results for the developing countries are generally the same in effect and direction. While, in 
Model 2, the variable of interest does not have a significant coefficient, it is the same in terms of 
having the same impact on the investment. Furthermore, it is significant when the quadratic term is 
included, even when the trend time effect is added in Models 3 and 4. In this way, the results are 
similar between developing and developed countries, although, in Model 4, the coefficients of 
developing countries are stronger. 
 
Table 8 shows the analysis for the sample group of thirty countries where the variable of labor costs 
is added and is considered important, as investors can choose countries where the cost of workforce 
is cheaper. Moreover, this variable improves accuracy with respect to the effect of the variable of 
interest, as it is then possible to carry out a robustness test. When, in Model 2, the labor costs 
variable is included, it is statistically significant and the negative effect is as expected. On the other 
hand, the informal labor market variable maintains the significant coefficient and the sense of the 
sign. The control variables included in the study maintain the results detailed above. In Model 3, the 
squared term coefficient is equally significant with the negative sign already explained. In Model 4, 
and in the successive models, the time trend effect is used, with the variable of informality 
maintaining its statistical significance at ten percent. In Model 5, despite the application of the 
robustness test, adding corruption and labor flexibility variables, the informality variable maintains 
both its statistical significance and its effect on the investment. While the informality variable does 
not appear significant after the quadratic term is added in Model 6, its importance is clear after the 
foregoing analysis. 
 
TABLE 8 
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6 Conclusions  
 
The analysis of FDI determinants has been a topic studied. However, the more the topic is 
disaggregated, the more discussion it provokes, as is the case with the effect of institutions on 
investments, which remains a controversial topic. Any institution may cause the costs assumed by 
investors to be reduced or increased. The institutions of the labor market, and specifically the 
informal sector, have been little analyzed. In this study, vulnerable employment was taken as a 
proxy of this sector. 
 
The purpose of this study was to answer the basic question of whether informal labor markets affect 
investment flows, as expressed by FDI. The analysis carried out in this study covered a total of 
sixty-five countries and the period between 1996 and 2009. The study’s principal findings can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
This study focused on informal institutions in terms of the informality of the labor market, 
expressed here using the term vulnerable employment, which seems to have a significant and 
positive effect on FDI flows. This reaffirms, therefore, that informal institutions have an important 
role in economic analysis, particularly when considering labor markets. When the robustness test 
was included in the analysis, by means of the inclusion of variables such as corruption or labor 
flexibility, it became clearer that the conditions of informal labor markets, proxied by vulnerable 
employment, may be capturing labor precariousness, such as employment quality, informal 
agreement, institutions development, etc., and that are attractive to investors. 
 
This study examined the relationship between informal labor markets and investment, revealing 
that, while the former has a positive impact, this is only true up to a given level, becoming negative 
after a certain point. The same pattern can be evinced from the analysis of the developed and 
developing countries. Moreover, when variables such as labor cost, labor flexibility and corruption 
were considered as part of cleaning of informal labor market effects, the significance and sense of 
the coefficients do not change between the different country subgroups. 
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8 Tables and Figures 
 
FIGURE 1 
FDI Flows as a percentage of world GDP (1970-2011). 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). www.unctad.org 
 
FIGURES 2 and 3 
 
 Source: 
own preparation. 
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FIGURE 4
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FIGURE 5 
 
 
                                            Source: own elaboration 
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TABLE 1: FDI Determinants. Developed and developing countries (1/2) 
Source: own preparation. * The direction of the effect depends on the group of countries and the sector is analyzed; NS = Not significant 
Note: The variables of each work were homogenized for a better comparability. 
 
Author Period and 
Countries 
Economic  
Variables 
Effect Institutional   
Variables 
Effect 
Naudé & Krugell (2007) 1970-1990 / 42 
countries  
Macroeconomic instability  
Human Capital 
 
- 
+ 
Corruption 
Governance  
- 
+ 
Dewit et al. (2009) 1986-1995 / 59 
countries 
Market Size  
Labor Costs 
+ 
- 
Labor Flexibility  
Union density 
 
- 
- 
Agiomirgianakis et al. (2006) 1975-1997 / 
20 Countries-
OCDE 
Size and growth market 
Workforce  Size 
Human Capital 
Agglomeration Economies 
Labor Costs 
Infrastructure 
Trade openness 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ /- 
- 
+ 
+ 
Economic –policy  integration + 
Ismail & Yussof (2003) 1985-1999 / 3 
countries 
Labor costs * 
Work force  size 
Market size *  
Human Capital * 
Innovation *  
Macroeconomic Stability *  
Trade openness * 
+ /- 
+ 
+ 
- 
- /NS 
- 
+ /S. 
  
Kucera (2002) 1993-1999 / 170 
countries  
Labor Costs 
Workforce size 
Trade openness 
Growth market  
Human Capital 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Labor Flexibility 
 
+ / 
 
Gross & Ryan  (2008) Late 80's and 
90's / 15 
countries 
Workforce size  
Labor Costs  
Agglomeration Economies  
Human Capital 
+ 
-, NS 
+ 
+ ,S. 
Employment protection legislation 
Economic -policy   integration 
Trade Unions *  
 
- 
+ 
+ / -, NS 
 
Bénassy-Quéré  et al. (2007) 2000 / 52 
countries -
OCDE. 
Market Size  
Agglomeration Economies  
Geographical distance 
Growth market  
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
Labor Flexibility  
Corruption 
Banking Sector 
Bureaucracy 
Governance  
- 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
Caetano (2009) 1995/1997-
2003/2005 / 25 
countries 
Growth market  
Trade openness  
Pro-investment politics* 
 
+ 
+ 
+ /- 
 
Government size 
Property rights * 
Corruption 
- 
+ /S. 
- ,S. 
Bevan et al. (2004) 1994 And 1998 / 
14 countries 
Market size  
Geographical distance 
Labor cost advantages 
+ 
- 
+ 
Financial System 
Trade openness  
Governance  
+ 
+ 
+ 
Grogan & Moers (2001) 1990-1998 / 25 
countries 
Macroeconomic stability 
Trade openness 
- 
+ 
Governance  
Pro-investment politics 
Property rights 
Informal  institutions: rules and trust 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Treviño & Mixon (2004) 1988-1999 / 7 
countries (L.A. ) 
Macroeconomic stability  + 
 
Governance  - 
Asiedu (2006) 1984-2000 1984-
2000 1984-2000 
1984-2000 1984-
2000 1984-2000 
/ 22 African 
countries 
Macroeconomic Stability  
Infrastructure 
Natural Resources 
Trade openness 
Human Capital 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
Informal institutions: corruption 
Governance  
Political instability  
- 
+ 
- 
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TABLE 1: FDI determinants. Developed and developing countries (2/2) 
Source: own preparation. * The direction of the effect depends on the group of countries and the sector is analyzed; NS = Not significant 
Note: The variables of each job were homogenized for a better comparability. 
 
 
 
Author Period and 
Countries 
Economic  
Variables 
Effect Institutional  
Variables 
Effect 
Gani (2007) 1996, 1998, 2000 
and 2002 / 17 
countries 
Growth  market  
Market Size 
Trade openness 
+ 
- 
+ 
 
Governance 
Corruption control 
Political instability 
+ 
+ 
- 
Du et al. (2008) 2001 / China  Agglomeration economies 
Labor Costs 
Infrastructure 
Human Capital 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
Government intervention *  
Intellectual property rights 
Corruption * 
 
- 
+ 
- /NS 
 
Fung et al. (2005) 1990-2002 / China 
- (USA, Japan, 
Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Korea) 
Market Size  
Labor costs *  
Infrastructure 
Agglomeration economies 
Human Capital *  
+ 
+ / -, NS 
+ / -, NS 
+ 
+, NS 
Government intervention  
 
- 
 
Leibrecht & Scharler (2009) 1995-2004 / 14 
countries  
Market Size 
Geographical distance 
Taxes 
Labor costs 
Pro-investment politics 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
Labor Flexibility  - 
Fathi et al. (2010) 1981-2005 / 69 
countries 
Growth market  
Trade openness 
Taxes 
Infrastructure 
Macroeconomic stability 
+ 
+ 
- 
NS 
NS 
Intellectual property rights 
 
+ 
Parcon (2008) 1990-2005 / 150 
countries-165 
countries 
Labor costs *  
Growth market  
Taxes 
Human Capital 
Macroeconomic Stability  
Trade openness 
+ /- 
+ 
-, NS 
- ,S. 
+ ,NS. 
+ 
+ 
Labor flexibility  
Corruption * 
+ /- 
+ /- 
Seyoum (2011) 2003-2005 / 107 
countries 
Market  size 
Growth market 
Trade openness  
Workforce size 
Human Capital 
Macroeconomic Stability 
+ 
+ /S. 
+ 
+ ,S. 
+ 
+ ,S. 
Informal institutions: trust and reputation 
 
+ 
 
Amal et al. (2010) 1996 And 2008 / 8 
countries (A. L. ) 
Macroeconomic Stability *  
Market Size  
Human Capital  
- 
+ 
+ 
Trade openness 
Corruption 
+ 
NS 
Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles 
(2003)  
1970-2009 / 18 
countries  
Market size  
Macroeconomic Stability  
Infrastructure 
+ 
- 
+ ,S. 
Trade openness  + 
Ranjan (2011) 1975-2009 / 
4 countries (BRIC) 
Market size 
Trade openness 
Labor Costs 
Infrastructure 
Macroeconomic stability 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
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TABLE 2 
Abbreviation Variable Source 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment (stock as % of GDP) United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development   
GDP Gross Domestic Product ( constant prices 2005) United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development   
GDPpc Gross Domestic Product per capita  (constant prices 
2005) 
United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development   
GDPg Growth rate of GDP United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development   
Openness Openness to trade (I + E as % GDP) United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development   
Inflation Inflation percentage  United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development   
L. Cost Labor costs (costs of compensation for hours of 
employees in the manufacturing industry) 
International 
Work Organization - Key 
Indicators  of the 
Labor  Market 
V. E. Workforce informality (vulnerable employment as a 
% of total employment) 
World Bank - World 
Development Indicators 
Corruption Corruption (Freedom from corruption) Heritage Foundation 
L. Flex Labor Flexibility  Fraser Institute - Economic 
freedom of the world  data 
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TABLE 3 
Argentina Cyprus Germany Japan Netherlands Portugal Thailand 
Australia Czech Republic Greece Korea (Rep. New Zealand  Romania Turkey 
Austria Denmark Honduras Latvia Nicaragua Russian Federation United Kingdom 
Belgium Ecuador Hungary Lithuania Norway Singapore Uruguay 
Bolivia Egypt Iceland Macedonia, FYR Pakistan Slovak Republic Venezuela, RB 
Brazil El Salvador Indonesia Malaysia Panama Slovenia   
Chile Estonia Ireland Malta Paraguay Spain   
Colombia Finland Israel Mexico Peru Sri Lanka   
Costa Rica France Italy Moldova Philippines Sweden   
Croatia Georgia Jamaica Morocco Poland Switzerland   
The highlighted countries correspond to the sample of thirty countries. 
 
 
TABLE 4 
  GDPpc GDPg Openness Inflation Corruption V. E. 
GDPpc 1           
GDPg -0.1616 1         
Openness 0.1204 0.1326 1       
Inflation -0.2964 -0.0892 -0.1304 1     
Corruption 0.8337 -0.1419 0.1774 -0.3357 1   
V. E. -0.8119 0.0956 -0.2334 0.2468 -0.692 1 
 
TABLE 5 
  Media  Median Minimum  Maximum St. Dev.  
GDPpc 15408.25 7271.36 498.74 67467.50 15816.97 
GDPg 3.26 3.65 -17.73 18.29 3.68 
Openness 87.96 75.85 1412 446.98 53.82 
Inflation 6.90 3.60 Y -1.71 154.76 1150 
V. E. 23.77 1940 2.20 66.10 16.64 
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TABLE 6 
65 Countries (1996-2009) 
      
VARIABLES Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
FDI (Lag)  0,750 *** 0,755 *** 0,722 *** 0,806 *** 
  (0.00165 ) (0.00333 ) (0.00272 ) (0.0107 ) 
GDPpc (log) 56.66 *** 15.95 *** 1642 *** -3.568 5,390 
 (5,427 ) (0,541 ) (0,727 ) (2,300 ) (3,743 ) 
GDPg -1.160 *** -0.602 *** -0.601 *** -0.444 *** -0.493 *** 
 (0,172 ) (0.00821 ) (0.00860 ) (0.0144 ) (0.0313 ) 
Openness 0,417 *** 0.0393 *** 0.0410 *** 0.0180 *** 0.0281 ** 
 (0.0563 ) (0.00339 ) (0.00520 ) (0.00414 ) (0.0117 ) 
Inflation 0.00423 -0.0433 *** -0.0393 *** -0.00827 0.00855 
 (0.0701 ) (0.00347 ) (0.00815 ) (0.00537 ) (0.00785 ) 
V. E. 0,489 ** 0.242 *** 1,014 *** 0,780 *** 1,556 *** 
 (0,239 ) (0.0320 ) (0.0633 ) (0.0927 ) (0,322 ) 
V. E. 2   -0.0114 *** -0.00854 *** -0.0171 *** 
   (0.000801 ) (0.00128 ) (0.00450 ) 
Corruption     -0.00146 
     (0.0287 ) 
L. Flex.     -0.145 
     (0,180 ) 
Fixed Effects Yes - - - - 
Time Trend No No No Yes Yes 
      
Constant -520.9 *** -140.7 *** -154.7 *** 26.52 -66.65 * 
 (48.94 ) (5,095 ) (6,956 ) (20.77) (34.68 ) 
      
Observations 847 721 721 721 473 
      
Number of countries 65 65 65 65 41 
Standard Errors in parentheses. *** P<0.01 , ** p<0.05 , * 1p<0.1 . In the model 5 the sample corresponds to 41 countries, it 
includes institutional variables: informality, Corruption" work flexibility.  
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                      TABLE 7 
 Developed and developing countries (1996-2009) 
 
  Developed Countries  Developing Countries 
VARIABLES  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
         
FDI (Lag)  0,815 *** 0,817 *** 0,816 ***  0,761 *** 0,736 *** 0,639 *** 
  (0.00661 ) (0.0120 ) (0.0132 )  (0.0145 ) (0.0175 ) (0.0257 ) 
GDPpc (log)  21.03 *** 20.66 *** 14.19 *  2,179 5,795 *** 18.30 *** 
  (2,999 ) (3,161 ) (8,214 )  (1,927 ) (2,010 ) (3,116 ) 
GDPg  -0.575 *** -0.598 *** -0.514 ***  -0.478 *** -0.492 *** -0.390 *** 
  (0.0386 ) (0.0438 ) (0.0679 )  (0.0215 ) (0.0252 ) (0.0291 ) 
Openness  0,101 *** 0,109 *** 0.0846 ***  0.00407 -0.00578 -0.00434 
  (0.00827 ) (0.00966 ) (0.0101 )  (0.0107 ) (0.00970 ) (0.0109 ) 
Inflation  -0.0885 ** -0.115 *** -0.0825 *  0.0398 *** 0.0193 0.0330 *** 
  (0.0406 ) (0.0378 ) (0.0422 )  (0.00865 ) (0.0118 ) (0.00532 ) 
V. E.  0,619 * 1,841 *** 1,452 **  0.0436 1,448 *** 0,788 *** 
  (0,370 ) (0,459 ) (0,629 )  (0.0565 ) (0,262 ) (0,240 ) 
V. E. 2   -0.0283 *** -0.0212 *   -0.0167 *** -0.0102 *** 
   (0.00855 ) (0.0114 )   (0.00315) (0.00267 ) 
         
Time Trend    Yes    Yes 
         
Constant  -215.6 *** -221.9 *** -153.5 *  -9.437 -61.54 *** 140.0 *** 
  (33.71 ) (34.68 ) (85.15 )  (15.94 ) (16.63 ) (26.48 ) 
         
Observations  377 377 377  344 344 344 
Number of countries  32 32 32  33 33 33 
Standard Errors in parentheses. *** P<0.01 , ** p<0.05 , * 1p<0.1 
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                                                             TABLE 8 
  1996-2009    
      
VARIABLES Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
      
FDI (lag) 0,821 *** 0,810 *** 0,721 *** 0,755 *** 0,706 *** 
 (0.00989 ) (0.0143 ) (0.0223 ) (0.0123 ) (0.0267 ) 
GDPpc 24.89 *** 29.65 *** -30.66 ** -28.99 *** -38.78 *** 
 (3,753 ) (6,483 ) (15.02 ) (9,167 ) (10.07 ) 
GDPg -0.989 *** -1.006 *** -0.258 ** -0.322 *** -0.236 *** 
 (0.0410 ) (0.0465 ) (0,119 ) (0.0875 ) (0.0908 ) 
Openness 0.0768 *** 0.0690 *** 0.0143 0.0357 ** 0.0470 *** 
 (0.0131 ) (0.0147 ) (0.0137 ) (0.0148 ) (0.0159 ) 
Inflation -0.752 *** -0.719 *** -0.409 *** -0.405 *** -0.306 * 
 (0,116 ) (0,150 ) (0,136 ) (0,149 ) (0,156 ) 
L. Cost -7.320 *** -7.758 *** -14.65 *** -0.527 *** -0.579 *** 
 (0,584 ) (1,299 ) (0,990 ) (0.0852 ) (0.0954 ) 
V. E. 0,735 *** 1,543 *** 1,519 ** 1,268 *** 1,193 
 (0,153 ) (0,353 ) (0,629 ) (0,214 ) (0,904 ) 
V. E. 2  -0.0150 *** -0.0206  -0.00771 
  (0.00576 ) (0.0132 )  (0.0191 ) 
Corruption    0.0254 0.0123 
    (0.0536 ) (0.0568 ) 
L. Flex.    0,478 0,575 
    (0,673 ) (0,835 ) 
      
Time Trend   Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant -232.1 *** -284.7 *** 315.7 ** -112.0 ** 366.8 *** 
 (36.66 ) (64.57 ) (147.4 ) (45.40 ) (98.39 ) 
      
Observations 348 348 348 348 348 
Number of 
countries 
30 30 30 30 30 
Standard Errors in parentheses. *** P<0.01 , ** p<0.05 , * 1p<0.1 
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